Photographs taken in public places often contain faces of bystanders thus leading to a perceived or actual violation of privacy. To address this issue, we propose to pseudo-randomly modify the appearance of face regions in the images using a privacy filter that prevents a human or a face recogniser from inferring the identity of people. The filter, which is applied only when the resolution is high enough for a face to be recognisable, adaptively distorts the face appearance as a function of its resolution. Moreover, the proposed filter locally changes the values of its parameters to counter attacks that attempt to estimate them. The filter exploits both global adaptiveness to reduce distortion and local parameter hopping to make their estimation difficult for an attacker. In order to evaluate the efficiency of the proposed approach, we consider an important scenario of oblique face images: photographs taken with low altitude Micro Aerial Vehicles (MAVs). We use a state-of-the-art face recognition algorithm and synthetically generated face data with 3D geometric image transformations that mimic faces captured from an MAV at different heights and pitch angles. Experimental results show that the proposed filter protects privacy while reducing distortion, and is also robust against attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Photography in public places raises privacy concerns as bystanders who happen to be within the field of view of a camera are captured as well. The identity of bystanders could be protected by locating and removing (or sufficiently distorting) key image regions, such as faces, using privacy filters. However, in order to maintain the aesthetic value of an image, only a minimal distortion should be introduced in an image to preserve its content.
A privacy filter for photography should satisfy the following properties: (a) introduce only a minimal distortion; (b) be robust against attacks; and (c) be computationally efficient. Minimal distortion is necessary to maintain the quality of a protected image close to the unprotected one so that the The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Peter Langendorfer. attention of a viewer is not diverted. Therefore blanking out a face [1] is not a desirable option. Robustness is important to avoid privacy violations by various attacks, e.g. brute-force, naïve, parrot and reconstruction attacks [2] - [12] . A bruteforce attack tries to decipher the protected probe images by an exhaustive search [3] , [5] . Other attacks use gallery images in addition to the protected probe images [4] , [6] - [8] . In a naïve attack, the protected probe images are compared against the unprotected gallery images [4] , [6] , [7] . In a parrot attack, the attacker has knowledge about the privacy filter and can transform the gallery images into the distorted domain [4] . In a reconstruction attack, the attacker has some knowledge of how to (partially) reconstruct the probe image from the protected to the unprotected domain [2] . Examples of reconstruction methods include inverse filtering and super-resolution techniques [2] , [8] . Finally, computational efficiency is desirable when the filter operates under limited VOLUME 7, 2019 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ computational and battery power, such as for example in the case of an MAV.
Recent frameworks that support facial privacy-preservation in airborne cameras are Generic Data Encryption [13] , Unmanned Aircraft Systems-Visual Privacy Guard [14] and Adaptive Gaussian Blur [15] . Generic Data Encryption sends an encrypted face region to a privacy server that Gaussian blurs or mosaics the face and then forwards it to an end-user. Unmanned Aircraft Systems-Visual Privacy Guard [14] and Adaptive Gaussian Blur [15] are aimed instead at on-board implementation with the objective to reduce latency and discourage brute-force attacks on the server [13] . Adaptive Gaussian Blur adaptively configures the Gaussian kernel depending upon the face resolution in order to minimise distortion, while Unmanned Aircraft Systems-Visual Privacy Guard blurs faces with a fixed filter. These methods are prone to parrot attacks [4] on the Gaussian blur.
In this paper, we present a novel privacy protection filter to be used on-board an MAV. The proposed filter distorts a face region with secret parameters to be robust to naïve, parrot and reconstruction attacks. The distortion is minimal and adaptive to the resolution of the captured face: we select the smallest Gaussian kernel that reduces the face resolution below a certain threshold. The selected threshold protects the face against the naïve attack as well as maintains its resolution at a specified level. To prevent other attacks, we then insert supplementary Gaussian kernels in the selected Gaussian kernel and hop their parameters locally using a pseudorandom number generator (PRNG) so their estimation from the filtered face image is made difficult. The block diagram of the proposed filter is shown in Figure 1 . In summary, the main contributions of this paper are: (1) the idea of using Gaussian hopping kernels for privacy and utility preservation, (2) the generation of a large-scale synthetic face image data set emulating faces captured from an MAV, and (3) extensive experiments to validate the proposed Gaussian hopping kernels, including reconstruction attacks.
The paper is organised as follows. Sec. II covers the stateof-the-art in visual privacy protection filters. Sec. III defines the problem. Sec. IV describes the proposed algorithm, and discusses its computational complexity and security level. Sec. V presents our face data set generation and Sec. VI discuss the experimental results. Finally, Sec. VII concludes the paper.
II. BACKGROUND
Visual privacy protection filters can be applied as a preprocessing or post-processing step (Fig. 2) .
Pre-processing privacy filters are irreversible and operate during image acquisition to prevent a camera from capturing sensitive regions. These filters disable the software or hardware of the camera or notify about photography prohibition [18] . Hardware based filters prevent the camera from taking images for example by bursting back an intense light for flash photography [19] or by detecting human face/body using an infrared sensor and then obfuscating using a spatial light modulator sensor placed in front of the Charge Coupled Device (CCD) sensor [20] , [21] .
Post-processing privacy filters protect sensitive regions after image acquisition and can be reversible or irreversible. Reversible filters conceal sensitive regions using a private key, which can later be used to recover the original sensitive region. Irreversible filters deform the features of a sensitive region permanently. Both reversible and irreversible filters can be non-adaptive or adaptive.
Reversible non-adaptive filters are based on generic encryption [3] , [10] , [22] - [24] . Reversible adaptive filters include scrambling [5] , [10] - [12] , [25] - [27] , warping [28] and morphing [29] . While reversible adaptive filters are robust against a parrot attack, their protected faces can be compromised by spatial-domain [30] , [31] or frequencydomain attacks [32] . [5] ; PICO: Privacy through Invertible Cryptographic Obscuration [3] ; GARP: Gender, Age and Race Preservation [16] ; UAS-VPG: Unmanned Aircraft Systems-Visual Privacy Guard [14] ; Cartooning [6] ; SVGB: Space Variant Gaussian Blur [17] ; ODBVP: Optimal Distortion-Based Visual Privacy [7] ; AGB: Adaptive Gaussian Blur [15] . Adaptive control modulates the strength of a privacy filter.
Irreversible non-adaptive filters blank out [1] , [33] or replace a face with a de-identified representation [4] . For example, to maintain k-anonymity, the algorithm k-Same [4] replaces k faces with their average face. Variants of this algorithm use additional specialised detectors to then preserve attributes such as facial expressions, pose, gender, race and age [16] , [34] - [36] . Neural network based filters (e.g. Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs)) also preserve such attributes using prior knowledge [37] - [44] .
Irreversible non-adaptive filters are robust to parrot attacks. Irreversible adaptive filters lower the resolution of a sensitive region so that humans or algorithms cannot recognise the identity. Examples include pixelation [9] , [45] , Gaussian blur [46] and cartooning [6] . The kernel size of the privacy filters can be manually selected [6] , [7] or only the centre kernel size is manually selected and then the Space Variant Gaussian Blur (SVBG) filter [17] automatically decreases the kernel size from the centre to the boundary of the detected face. Adaptive Gaussian Blur (AGB) [15] exploits the different horizontal and vertical resolutions that are typical in aerial photography and automatically adapts an anisotropic kernel based on the resolution of the detected face. However, irreversible adaptive filters are vulnerable to parrot attacks.
As a summary, Table 1 compares representative filters for the following categories: reversible & adaptive [5] , reversible & non-adaptive [3] , and irreversible & non-adaptive filters [16] . The remaining [6] , [7] , [14] , [15] , [17] and our proposed approaches are irreversible & adaptive filters.
III. PROBLEM DEFINITION
Let the set D = {R k } K k=1 contain face data of K subjects, where k represents the identity of a person (label). Let each subject k appear in at most Z images, i.e. R k = {R i |i ≤ Z }. Let R G , R P ⊂ D be the gallery and probe sets, respectively. Usually |R G | > |R P |, where |.| is the cardinality of a set, and R G ∩ R P = ∅.
A. PRIVACY FILTER
Let a privacy filter F j : R P →R P distort image features in order to reduce the probability P for an attacker to correctly predict labels. This operation produces a protected probe setR P , whose distortion depends on j , where j ∈ {h, v} indicates the horizontal and vertical direction in an image. Let the distortion generated by F j be measured by the Peak Signal to Noise Ratio (PSNR):
where R max is the dynamic range of the pixel values. The mean square error, MSE, between the pixel intensities of an unprotected, R ∈ R P , and protected,R ∈R P , face is
where W and H are the width and height of R, respectively. We relate the privacy level of a face region to the accuracy η of a face recogniser [6] , [7] . The value of η is the commutative rank-n for face identification or the Equal Error rate (EER) for face verification. We consider in this paper face verification, thus
where TP and TN are true positives and true negatives, respectively. Our target is to force a face recogniser of an attacker to have the accuracy of a random classifier, which for face verification is = 0.5. We therefore aim to design F j that irreversibly but minimally distorts the appearance of R so that the identity is not recognisable with a probability higher than a random guess.
where B ∈ {R G ,R G ,R G }. The first term aims to introduce a minimal distortion, whereas the second term forces the classification results to be equivalent to those of a random classifier, irrespective of whether the filtered or reconstructed face is compared against the unprotected, filtered or reconstructed gallery data sets. The second term is dependent upon the recognition capability of a face recogniser and is heuristically calculated for a given face recogniser, i.e. the minimum distortion at which the face recogniser starts behaving similarly to a random classifier [47] - [49] .
B. ATTACKS
The content of R should be protected against naïve-T, parrot-T and reconstruction attacks. Let an attacker have access to B ∈ {R G ,R G ,R G }, whereR G is the filtered gallery data set andR G is the filtered and reconstructed gallery data set. An attacker can modifyR P , R G , or both, to correctly predict K ofR P . In a naïve attack (here referred to as naïve-T attack), a privacy filter is applied on R P to generate a protected probe data setR P , while the unaltered R G is used for training [4] . A parrot attack (here referred to as parrot-T attack), learns the privacy filter type and its parameters j (e.g. Gaussian blur of certain standard deviation used to generateR P ). Then, the learned filter is applied on R G to generate a privacy protected gallery data setR G . Finally,R G andR P are used for training and testing, respectively [4] . In a reconstruction attack, the discriminating features ofR P are first restored (e.g. using an inverse filter or a super-resolution algorithm) to generate a reconstructed probe data setR P and then compared against R G or a reconstructed gallery data setR G . An inverse filter first estimates the parameters of a privacy filter usingR P and then performs an inverse operation to reconstruct the original faces [2] . Similarly, a super-resolution algorithm first learns embeddings (i.e. relationships) between the high-resolution and their corresponding low-resolution faces and then reconstructs the high-resolution faces for R P [8] .
IV. PROPOSED APPROACH
In order to minimally distort R as well as to achieve robustness against brute-force, naïve-T, parrot-T and reconstruction attacks, we propose the Adaptive Hopping Gaussian Mixture Model (AHGMM) algorithm. AHGMM consists of a globally estimated optimal Gaussian Point Spread Function (PSF) and supplementary Gaussian PSFs added inside the optimal Gaussian PSF. For a single supplementary Gaussian PSF inside an optimal Gaussian PSF, AHGMM is illustrated in Fig. 3 , while the pseudo-code is given in Algorithm 1.
(A list with the notation used in this paper is presented in Table 4 .) 
A. PIXEL DENSITY ESTIMATION
Let an MAV capture an image I while flying at an altitude of h 1 meters. Let the principal axis P of its on-board camera be tilted by θ P from the nadir direction N (see Figure 4 ). We assume that height h 1 and tilt angle θ P of the camera can be estimated. A value of θ P = 0 generates an oblique image. Let h 2 be the height of the face above ground. 1 We represent the face region in the image as R ∈ R k ⊂ D, which is viewed at an angle θ R .
Let ρ j represent the pixel density (px/cm) around the centre C R of R. If p h and p v represent the physical dimensions of a pixel in the horizontal and vertical direction, respectively and f is the focal length of the camera, the horizontal density ρ h Algorithm 1 AHGMM Input: I : unprotected image R : detected face region ρ j : pixel density, where j ∈ {h, v} Output:
end for 6: R ← N sub-regions of R 7:
for n = 1 : N do 8: for m = 0 : M do 9: for j = h : v do 10: if m = 0 then 11:
end if 17: end for 18 :
φ nm ← generate weights 21: end for 22: M n ← Gaussian mixture model 23:R n ← R n * M n 24: end for 25 :R ← apply global filter onR 26: I p ← replace R withR in I 27: return I p 28: end procedure for a pixel around C R [15] is
and the vertical density ρ v , by exploiting the small angle approximation for a single pixel of the image sensor [15] , is
Let ω R ∈ {0, 1} define whether R is naturally protected (ω R = 0) because of a low horizontal and vertical density, or not (ω R = 1) [15] :
where ρ o h and ρ o v are pixel densities at which a state-of-theart machine algorithm starts recognising human faces, and simply called thresholds. If ω R = 0, then the original frame I can be transmitted without any modifications. Otherwise, R should be protected by a privacy filter to reduce its pixel densities below ρ o h and ρ o v . When R is not inherently protected, we assume that the corresponding bounding box is given.
B. OPTIMAL GAUSSIAN PSF
A 2D PSF g(h, v), or impulse response, is the output of a filter when the input is a point source. In the discrete domain [50] , it is given as
In the case of Gaussian blur, g(h, v) is an approximated Gaussian function of mean µ j = 0 and standard deviation σ j > 0 [7] , [15] , [17] , and thus called a Gaussian PSF of parameter j = (µ j , σ j ). More specifically, the parameter σ j ∈ {σ jl |l ∈ N, σ jl+1 > σ jl } controls the distortion strength of F j and provides pixel density ρ j ∈ {ρ jl |l ∈ N, ρ jl+1 < ρ jl } inR, respectively.
As a higher σ j results in a lower ρ j , we first find the minimum value called optimal parameter σ o j of σ j that makes ρ j < ρ o j . As a result, σ o j provides the minimum distortion inR while making it robust against the naïve-T attack (i.e. P(R|R G ) → ). Increasing σ j beyond σ o j increases the distortion without improving the privacy level as the recogniser performance is already at the level of a random classifier. For a face captured from an MAV with pixel densities ρ j , we calculate o j = (µ o j , σ o j ) of an optimal Gaussian PSF (lines 2-5 in Algorithm 1), where µ o j = 0 like in traditional Gaussian blur [7] , [15] , [17] and σ o j [15] is estimated as described below.
A Gaussian PSF of standard deviation σ o j in the spatial domain is another Gaussian PSF of standard deviationσ o j in the frequency domain and both the Gaussian PSFs are related asσ
whereσ o j is measured in cycles/cm, σ o j in px and ρ j in px/cm. Let f s represent the Nyquist frequency of ρ j . Let f o s < f s be the highest spatial frequency component that we want to completely remove using a low-pass filter (i.e. Gaussian blur).
We can consider f o s to be the Nyquist frequency for ρ o j , i.e. the pixel density after filtering, and therefore
As we are interested in removing frequency components beyond f o s , we can select f o s = 3σ o j because the amplitude response of a Gaussian PSF at three times of its standard deviation is very close to zero and multiplication (convolution in space domain) with such a Gaussian PSF will suppress frequencies larger than f o s . Substituting f o s = 3σ o j in Eq. 10, in the resulting relation Eq. 9 and finally rearranging gives VOLUME 7, 2019 the optimal standard deviation of Gaussian PSF as
C. HOPPING GMM KERNELS
Filtering R with the optimal Gaussian PSF defined by o j would only protect R from a naïve-T attack but not from a parrot-T attack and a reconstruction attack. To ensure that the probability of correctly predicting the label ofR is not increased in case of the parrot-T attack (i.e. P(R|R G ) → ) as well as the reconstruction attack (i.e. P(R|R G ) → or P(R|R G ) → ), we secretly modify o j to¯ o j while generat-ingR so that an adversary is unable to accurately reconstruct face regionR, or even to generateR G andR G . For this purpose, we generate a set R which consists of N sub-regions in such a way that each sub-region covers a small area of R:
The size of R n (in pixels) affects the total number of subregions N per face region R, which could influence its privacy level. Smaller values of N (larger sub-regions) result in a reduced distortion. After finding o j = (µ o j , σ o j ) and generating R, we make a hopping mixture of Gaussian for each sub-region, i.e. we pseudo-randomly change o j to¯ o j for each R n . Moreover, we select supplementary Gaussian PSFs inside this optimal Gaussian PSF and vary their parameters based on pseudorandom weights (lines 9-17 in Algorithm 1).
Let the set X contain the parameters of the modified optimal and supplementary Gaussian PSFs for each sub-region. This set is represented as
where M is the number of supplementary Gaussian PSFs. The element m = 0 represents the modified optimal Gaussian PSF given by
while the remaining elements (i.e. m ∈ (0, M ]) belong to the supplementary Gaussian PSFs. These elements are calculated as
where α jm ∈ [0, 1] and β jm ∈ [0, 1] are normalised pseudorandomly generated numbers and control the local distortion in filtering. The variable γ jm ∈ (0, 1] controls the relative size of the supplementary Gaussian PSF w.r.t. the optimal Gaussian PSF. After generating the parameters of the Gaussian PSFs, a set G representing 2D anisotropic-discretised Gaussian PSFs corresponding to X is created as where each G nm is calculated (line 19 in Algorithm 1) as [51] 
where
and
with ψ j = 2 3σ j + 1. In order to develop a mixture model from the M discretised Gaussian PSFs of each sub-region, a set of weights φ is required. We again utilise a PRNG to generate φ such that
Finally, a set of mixture models is generated for each subregion (line 22 in Algorithm 1) as
where each element is calculated as
D. LOCAL AND GLOBAL FILTERING
We have now N discretised Gaussian mixture models in M for N sub-regions of R. We locally convolve each sub-region R n (Eq. 12) with their respective M n to generate a protected sub-regionR n :R
whereR n = R n * M n . Changing the convolutional kernel for each sub-region generates blocking artefacts (see Fig. 5 ).
To smooth these artefacts, we apply a global convolution filter 
where Q j represents the sub-region size in pixels. As a result, the smoothed protected faceR is generated to replace R in the original image I thus leading to the protected image I p . Fig. 6 shows sample images filtered by AHGMM with different thresholds.
E. COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY
The generation of a convolutional kernel is more complex in AHGMM than in the adaptive Gaussian blur filter [15] . In fact, the latter only needs to compute a single Gaussian function, while AHGMM requires the computation of N · M Gaussian functions. Moreover, the adaptive Gaussian blur exploits the separability property of 2D convolutional kernels, i.e. ψ = ψ h * ψ v , to reduce the number of multiplications and additions from W · H · |ψ h | · |ψ v | to W · H · (|ψ h | + |ψ v |) (W and H represent the width and height of R in pixels, respectively). Instead, AHGMM dynamically reconfigures the convolutional kernel after processing each sub-region and therefore requires exactly W · H · |ψ h | · |ψ v | multiplications and additions.
V. DATASET GENERATION
To the best of our knowledge, there exists no large publicly available face dataset collected from an MAV. We therefore generate face images as if they were captured from an MAV via geometric transformation and down-sampling of the LFW dataset [52] . The LFW dataset was collected in an unconstrained environment with extreme illumination conditions and extreme poses. We use the standard verification benchmark test of the LFW dataset (12000 images of 4281 subjects), divided into 10-folds for cross-validation. Each fold contains 600 images of the same subject and 600 images of different subjects. We use the deep funnelled version of the LFW dataset. Figure 8 shows sample images of the stages of the dataset generation pipeline. We fit a 3D Morphable Model (3DMM) [53] on an input image to detect 68 facial landmarks [54] and then iteratively fit a 3DMM to generate a 3D image representation. 2 As there may be only a few degrees pitch of the subject captured in the images (e.g. a person looking slightly downward or upward), we rotate the 3D image at 0 • pitch by applying a geometric transformation computed from the estimated pose of the fitted 3DMM. This disturbs the image alignment of the original data set, so a realignment is required, which we perform after generating the pitch effect. The synthetic pitch angles vary from 0 • to 70 • with a step size of 10 • and project it back to generate a corresponding 2D image. In order to align this image so that the eyes and nose appear at the same place among the images belonging to the same pitch angle, we apply an affine transformation computed by detecting eyes and nose tip using the Dlib library [55] such that the transformed face has a resolution of 96 × 96 pixels. As the detection accuracy of the eyes and nose decrease with increasing pitch angle, we generate a ground truth (location of eyes and nose tip) of the 0 • pitch angle images and use it for the higher pitch angle images.
Finally, to introduce different height effects for the 8 synthetically generated images, we down-sample them by a factor of 2, 4, 8 and 16 generating images of 48 × 48, 24 × 24, 12 × 12, 6 × 6 pixels, respectively. Thus, we increase the size of the original standard verification test of the LFW data set by 40 times, i.e. from 12000 images to 480000 images. Fig. 7 shows 40 sample images belonging to the same and different subjects.
We manually determined the values of ρ h and ρ v as where S c is the cropped face size in pixels, γ = 90 • − θ R is the pitch angle of the camera, and S h and S v are the average human face dimensions, i.e. the bitragion breadth of 15.45 cm and menton-crinion length of 20.75 cm, respectively [56].
VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS

A. EXPERIMENTAL SET UP
We compare AHGMM against Space Variant Gaussian Blur (SVGB) [17] , AGB [15] and Fixed Gaussian Blur (FGB), which uses a constant Gaussian kernel defined with respect to the highest resolution face. Thus, we estimate the kernel for FGB as in [15] for the face with 96 × 96 pixels at 0 • pitch angle. For the SVGB filter, we divide the face into four concentric circles and reduce the kernel size by 5% while radially moving out between two consecutive regions as in [17] . Although the kernel for the innermost region was manually selected in the original work, we choose the anisotropic kernel as estimated by the AGB [15] and convert it into an isotropic kernel for a fair comparison. We use a block size of 4 × 4 and m = 1 for AHGMM.
To compare privacy filters, we measure the face verfication accuracy using OpenFace [57] , an open source implementation of Google's face recognition algorithm FaceNet [58] . OpenFace uses a deep Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) as a feature extractor, which is applied on the training and test images to extract their representations (embeddings) for classification [58] . While the performance of other TABLE 2. Attacks used to evaluate the privacy level of the proposed AHGMM algorithm. Both the gallery faces and the probe faces can be protected or unprotected (naïve-BL). Moreover, the protected faces could be either unchanged or reconstructed (e.g. through an inverse-filter (IF) or super-resolution (SR)). Finally, any AHGMM attack could be further divided into three sub-attacks corresponding to the prior-knowledge of an attacker: optimal, pseudo and accurate. face recognisers may be slightly better than OpenFace [57] (e.g. SphereFace [59] or ArcFace [60] ), their use is not expected to modify the objective of our experiments, which is the analysis of a face recognition algorithm under different privacy attacks.
To measure distortion as in [6] , [61] , we use the PSNR, the power ratio of the original image with respect to the filtered image.
We perform experiments with 480000 images (consisting of 5 different resolutions and 8 different pitch angles) to determine the validity of the proposed AHGMM to protect the identity information of an individual. For this purpose, we analyse the effect of a naïve-T attack, a parrot-T attack, an inverse filter attack and a super-resolution attack. Moreover, we quantify the corresponding fidelity degradation caused by AHGMM.
Although the synthetic data set include some artifacts (especially for the high pitch angles as, shown in Fig. 7) , these do not affect the nature of the analysis, whose objective is to study the relative robustness of privacy filters for a given data set: we use data at the same resolution and pitch angle, including the artifacts, to train and test OpenFace [57] . Moreover, the training set and testing set could be protected or unprotected depending upon the attack type.
As AGB and SVGB do not use any secret key, we evaluate them only using their accurate parameters in the parrot-T, inverse filter and super-resolution attacks. In contrast, any of these attacks on AHGMM can be further divided into three sub-attacks: optimal kernel, pseudo AHGMM and accurate AHGMM. In the optimal kernel sub-attack, we assume that an attacker is able to estimate the parameters of the optimal kernel and applies the optimal kernel to the entire face. In the pseudo AHGMM sub-attack, we assume that the attacker knows the optimal kernel and randomly modifies the filter parameter for the N sub-regions. In the accurate AHGMM sub-attack, we assume that the attacker has access to the secret key and can decipher all the parameters of the filter for the N sub-regions. As this prior knowledge can be exploited for both probe and gallery images, we evaluate AHGMM under 13 different scenarios (see Table 2 ).
We assume that an attacker is able to determine the pitch angle of a protected face using the background information of an image captured from an MAV and can apply a geometric transformation to modify the gallery images at that pitch angle. Therefore, in all the following attacks, both the gallery and the probe images are at the same pitch angle that can be protected or unprotected depending upon the attack type. Moreover, we use the same resolution for both the gallery images and the probe images.
B. NAÏVE-T Attack
First of all, we perform a naïve-BL attack which shows the baseline face verfication accuracy when both the probe data set and the gallery data set are unprotected. The results of the naïve-BL attack are given in Fig. 9 . Then we perform a naïve-T attack in which the gallery images are unprotected, while the probe images are protected using FGB, SVGB [17] , AGB [15] and AHGMM. The results of this attack are given in Fig. 10 at different thresholds ρ o j . The naïve-BL attack shows that the accuracy η of our synthetically generated data set decreases with the decrease of the face resolution and with the increase in the face pitch angle. However, this trend vanishes at high pitch angles, i.e. 60 • and 70 • , where it shows a slight randomness. Finally, for the low resolution faces (6 × 6 pixels), the accuracy does not show any effect of the pitch angle and slightly oscillates. Therefore, we consider 6 × 6 pixels inherently privacy protected and remove these images from the analysis of the privacy filters.
From the naïve-T attack, we are interested in finding the optimal threshold which defines the optimal kernel for AGB [15] (see Section IV and Eq. 11). It is clear from Fig. 10 that the accuracy of the naïve-T attack decreases while decreasing the threshold. When the threshold reaches 0.5 px/cm, the difference between the accuracy achieved by AGB [15] and a random classifier (η = 0.5) becomes very small except, unexpectedly, at high pitch angles. This difference further decreases at 0.4 px/cm and 0.3 px/cm. Thus, the optimal threshold defining the optimal kernel can be 0.5 px/cm, 0.4 px/cm and 0.3 px/cm. The last two thresholds decrease the accuracy negligibly, but distort the images severely. Therefore, we analysed the trade-off of accuracy (under naïve, parrot attack and reconstruction attacks) and distortion for these three thresholds.
At these three thresholds under the naïve-T attack, the accuracy of AHGMM is higher as compared to the AGB [15] . The main reason for this slightly higher accuracy is due to the under blurred sub-regions of the AHGMM filtered face as it hops its kernel below and above the optimal Gaussian kernel. In contrast, the accuracy of the Space Variant Gaussian Blur [17] is always lower than AGB and AHGMM. This is because SVGB uses an isotropic Gaussian kernel which deteriorates a face more severely as compared to the anisotropic kernel of the AGB and AHGMM filter. FGB has the lowest accuracy at any threshold due to over blurring of all images except 96 × 96 pixels images at 0 • pitch angle.
C. PARROT-T ATTACK
In the parrot-T attack, we filter both gallery and probe images and then evaluate the achieved accuracy. We study the parrot-T attack on AHGMM under three sub-attacks: optimal kernel parrot-T sub-attack, pseudo-AHGMM parrot-T sub-attack and accurate AHGMM parrot-T sub-attack. The accuracy results of these sub-attacks are given in Fig. 10 at different thresholds ρ o j , while Receiver Operating Curves (ROCs) for the accurate AHGMM parrot-T sub-attack at ρ o j = 0.5 px/cm are presented in Fig. 11 .
The parrot-T attack on state-of-the-art privacy filters increases the accuracy as compared to the naïve-T attack. Under the optimal kernel parrot sub-attack, our AHGMM shows the least accuracy improvement at any of the three thresholds. This is because the optimal kernel Gaussian blur is a spatially invariant blur that is not helpful in recognising spatially varying Gaussian blurred images, e.g. the AHGMM filtered images. Thus, our AHGMM provides the lowest accuracy against the parrot-T attack using the optimal kernel.
The pseudo AHGMM parrot-T sub-attack slightly improves the accuracy further as compared to the optimal kernel parrot-T sub-attack. The main reason is that both the gallery and the probe images are now filtered using spatially varying Gaussian blur. However, under the pseudo AHGMM sub-attack, the accuracy of AHGMM remains below the other three state-of-the-art privacy filters. Thus, our AHGMM provides the highest privacy protection even against the pseudo AHGMM parrot sub-attack.
Finally, the accurate AHGMM sub-attack improves the accuracy as compared to the optimal kernel and almost eqivalent to the pseudo AHGMM sub-attacks. Comparatively, even under the accurate AHGMM sub-attack, AHGMM performs better than FGB, AGB [15] and SVGB [17] at these three thresholds with the least improvement at ρ o j = 0.3 px/cm. From the accurate AHGMM sub-attack, it is apparent that AHGMM permanently removes the sensitive information from the face and an attacker can not recognise it with a high accuracy even when he/she has access to the secret key. This is in contrast to the reversible filters, e.g. encryption/scrambling based filters, which can reconstruct the original face after having the secret key. Thus, AHGMM is robust against a brute-force attack.
D. INVERSE FILTER ATTACK
In the inverse-filter (IF) attack, we reconstruct the probe images by deconvolving the protected face with an accurate or estimated kernel. We evaluate the IF attack under four subattacks: optimal kernel naïve-IF sub-attack, pseudo AHGMM naïve-IF sub-attack, accurate AHGMM naïve-IF sub-attack and accurate AHGMM parrot-IF sub-attack. Fig. 12 depicts the effect of inverse filtering on selected sample images protected with AGB, SVGB and AHGMM. Fig. 13 shows the achieved accuracies under the different sub-attacks at different values of ρ o j , while Fig. 14 presents ROCs for the accurate AHGMM parrot-IF sub-attack at ρ o j = 0.5 px/cm. As can be seen in Fig. 12 , the face reconstruction quality decreases when the threshold increases (increasing the filter kernel) even if the filter parameters are known. This is true for both space invariant Gaussian blur (i.e. AGB) and linear space variant Gaussian blur (i.e. SVGB). The main reason is that the boundaries of the face start propagating towards the centre of the face as the threshold is decreased. Thus, it becomes difficult to distinguish between reconstructed faces at the lower thresholds (see Fig. 13 ).
In case of non-linear space variant blur (AHGMM), the reconstruction becomes more challenging even when the same hopping kernels are used as for the protection. The main reason, in addition to the boundary propagation, is that while deconvolving a sub-region, the IF incorrectly treats the adjacent subregions as if they were filtered with the same kernel, thus not enabling it to reconstruct the original face (see Fig. 12 ). Consequently, it becomes difficult to accurately predict the label of the reconstructed face.
In contrast to naïve-IF attacks, parrot-IF attack is more severe and increases significantly the accuracy, especially for AGB, FGB and SVGB. AHGMM also shows the accuracy improvement but less than AGB, FGB and SVGB; and is more robust to an inverse filter attack even when using an accurate secret key.
E. SUPER-RESOLUTION ATTACK
In this attack, we reconstruct the filtered probe images with SRCNN [8] . SRCNN first learns a mapping between the highresolution images and their corresponding low-resolution version, and then applies this mapping to enhance the details of a low-resolution image. We learn the SRCNN mapping for 1,000,000 iterations between the protected images (i.e. the low resolution) and their corresponding unprotected images (i.e. the high resolution) using the same data sets (91-images and Set5) as used in [8] . Such a mapping is separately learned for each privacy filter (i.e. AGB, SVGB, and AHGMM). As learning the mapping is a time consuming process, we investigate the super-resolution attack for a single point of our synthetic data set: 12000 images each with 96 × 96 pixels and 0 • pitch angle. We evaluate the super-resolution (SR) attack under four sub-attacks: optimal kernel naïve-SR sub-attack, pseudo AHGMM naïve-SR sub-attack, accurate AHGMM naïve-SR sub-attack and accurate AHGMM parrot-SR sub-attack. Tab. 3 summarises the accuracies under the different sub-attacks, while Fig. 15 depicts a visual comparison of the super-resolution reconstruction for three sample faces protected by AGB, SVGB and AHGMM filters. Fig. 16 presents the ROC for the accurate AHGMM parrot-SR sub-attack. [8] for threshold ρ o j = 0.5 px/cm. The reconstruction performance deteriorates from AGB [15] over SVGB [17] to AHGMM protected faces. For the space-invariant Gaussian blur (AGB), it is apparent from Fig. 15 that the SR attack can reconstruct the faces more effectively, even when the kernel size is quite high (i.e. ρ o j = 0.5 px/cm). Therefore, the faces protected by AGB achieves a higher accuracy (see Tab. 3). In contrast, faces protected by linear space variant Gaussian blur (SVGB) are difficult to reconstruct. The main reason is that the SR mapping becomes erroneous especially for patches which contain parts processed by different kernels. However, SR can effectively reconstruct patches where the Gaussian blur is locally invariant (e.g. compare the areas around the eyes of the SVGB restored faces in Fig. 15 ). The overall reconstruction is worse than for AGB and thus the achieved accuracy is lower.
Reconstruction by super-resolution is even more challenging for AHGMM protected faces. The main reason is that a single patch for learning the mapping contains several sub-regions each filtered with pseudo-randomly correlated Gaussian mixture models. Thus, the error in the learned SR mapping increases thus resulting in the lowest accuracy as compared to AGB and SVGB.
Similarly to the parrot-IF attack, the accuracy improves for the parrot-SR attack where SR-reconstruction is also performed for the gallery images. Especially for AGB and SVGB, the similarity between (protected and reconstructed) gallery images and the (reconstructed) probe images increases. Thus, the accuracy increases. As for the other attacks, AHGMM is more robust to parrot attacks than AGB and SVGB, and achieves the lowest accuracy. 
F. DISTORTION ANALYSIS
We measure the distortion of FGB, SVGB [17] , AGB [15] and AHGMM using PSNR. For a trade-off analysis between distortion and privacy, we plot the face verification accuracy against PSNR. The results of this trade-off analysis are presented in Fig. 17 .
AGB [15] has the highest average PSNR values followed by SVGB [17] , AHGMM and FGB. The main reason is that AGB uses a single anisotropic kernel instead of the spatially and linearly varying kernel used by SVGB [17] . Although AHGMM also uses an anisotropic kernel like AGB, the spatial hopping phenomena of the Gaussian mixture model of AHGMM result in high distortion (PSNR values) as compared to AGB and SVGB (see Fig. 6 ). FGB has the highest distortion as it does not change its parameters depending upon the resolution of the face. 
VII. CONCLUSION
We presented an irreversible visual privacy protection filter that is robust against parrot, inverse-filter and superresolution attacks on protected image regions. The proposed filter uses an adaptive hopping Gaussian mixture model and adapts its parameters depending upon the resolution of sensitive regions in order to minimise distortion, while locally and pseudo-randomly hopping them to prevent an attacker from estimating them. We evaluated AHGMM using a stateof-the-art face recognition algorithm and a synthetic face data set with faces at different pitch angles and resolutions that emulate faces as captured from an MAV. The proposed algorithm provides the highest privacy protection under a parrot, an inverse-filter and a super-resolution attack and an almost equivalent level of privacy to state-of-the-art privacy filters under a naïve attack. Unlike face-de-identification approaches ( [4] , [16] , [34] - [36] , [41] - [44] , [62] ), we do not depend on an auxiliary visual detector (i.e. pose, facial expression, age, gender, race) to counter a parrot, an inversefilter or a super-resolution attack. Moreover, unlike encryption/scrambling filters ( [3] , [5] , [10] - [12] , [22] - [26] , [28] , [29] ), we prevent the recovery of the original values of the protected region even with access to the seed of the PRNG.
A work that extends the proposed privacy filter to videos and that removes the jitter introduced by the proposed filter is presented in [63] .
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